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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF u·rAH 
JOSEPH LA VERN ~OYER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD CLARK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8681 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was tried before the court without a jury. 
The appeal is taken from the judgment of the court in 
favor of the respondent and against the app·ellant, de-
creeing that no public highway or other public easement 
exists from Utah State Highway No. 133 over the prop-
erty of the respondent in Middle c·anyon in Section 33, 
Township 3 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
Summit County, Utah (R. 15). 
The Middle Canyon road extends in a northerly 
direction from the Coalville-Upton road, State Highway 
No. 133, up Middle Canyon and over the ridge onto the 
Gras.s Creek road (R. 24). 
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The action was brought to determine whether Middle 
Canyon road .and trail is a road open to the public for 
travel. Incidental remedies were sought for damages 
growing out of a specific incident and for a restraining 
order restraining the respondent from interfering with 
the travel of the public upon- the highway (R. 1-3). 
The property in question was a part of the public 
domain until the issuance of a p.atent by the United States 
Government to the Union Pacific Railroad on January 
7, 1~02 (R. 68). The respondent, Clifford Clark and his 
wife, Bertha W. Clark, acquired title to the property 
on the 21st day of July, 1944 "subject to lawful existing 
rights of way and easements over the same, ... " (R. 184) 
J.ames H. Judd, a man over 84 years of age (R. 99), 
has been acquainted with -the-- "~fiddle Canyon Road," 
the road here in question, since his first recollection when 
he wa.s about 8 or 10 years of age (R. 100). He, therefore, 
has known the road since about 1880 to 1882. He drove 
c~ttle, sheep and a wagon over it (R. 100). He used the 
road for 50 year.s or more, comn1encing when he was 10 
ye.ars of age, and during that time no one tried to pre-
vent him from traveling it (R. 100). In response to the 
question, "What others used it besides yourself~" Mr. 
Judd replied, "vVell, anybody was traveling it that wanted 
to." (R. 100) Others traveled it on horses and in wagons 
at the time the Grass Creek Mines were in operation 
(R. 100). Mr. Judd hauled coal on the road cros.sing the 
Fewkes place (pren1ises no"T o'Yned by respondent) (R. 
27) for fifty years (R. 101). Others were using it for the 
same purpose (R. 101). After his marriage he and his 
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wife used the road to visit .his wife's parents ~n Grass 
Creek (Ro 101-102)0 They travled in a wagon, a white 
top rig and any way they had of going, including a cart 
(Ro 102). He stated that his use.of the road commenced 
in the early 1880s and h.as continued to later years (R. 
102) 0 For fifty years he traveled it every week or two, 
hauling coal out of there and to Upton up to about 30 
years ago (Ro 103). I-le and other people had reason 
besides hauling coal to go up the Canyon because they 
had c.attle and sheep there (R. 104) 0 He testified that 
nearly everybody was hauling coal out of there (R. 104)0 
He hauled coal while it was an open range (Ro 104)0 
(This would be prior to the issuance of the patent in 
1902). He also did work on the road and helped to improve 
it and rode the canyon on horseback nearly every day 
(R. 104)o 
James H. Wilde, 76 years of age, was bo:rn in 1880 
(Ro 108). He went up Middle Canyon when he wa.s a 
kid of 12 to 14 years of age (R. 108) 0 He testified that 
you ·get into Middle Canyon from the Upton-Coalville 
Road and that it has been that way as long as he can 
remember (R. 108). He traveled the road on foot and 
on horseback (R. 109). He saw Will Robinson haul coal 
out of there (R. 109), and he stated that, "When people 
wanted to go up there, they went up there" (Ro 109). 
He testified there was no Grass Creek road; that you 
could go over . there but you would have quite a time 
(R. 110). He also said he fetched cattle out the Middle 
Canyon road three times he could remember, but was 
not on the road like lots of others and did not know 
where it started (Ro111). 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph H. Boyer, the father of the ap~pellant, knew 
the Middle Canyon Road 60 years before he testified 
(R. 127). (That would be about 1896) He used the Middle 
Canyon Road to get wood (R. 128). He testified that 
some people went to Grass Creek to the mines at that 
time (R. 128). Other people used the road to haul coal 
from Clark Mines in Section 28 (R.;128). William Diston 
traveled the road to work at the mines in Grass Creek 
(R. 129). thirty five or forty years ago (R. 130). Mr. 
Boyer testified, "In 1900 there was not any land bought 
and people used to go up in there with livestock back 
and forth. That was quite a traveled road up in there 
with livestock. One man would go in with stock one 
way and another man would go in the other way before 
the land was bought" (R. 130). "The people who bought 
the land used to go up and down there all the time 
traveling that road" (R. 130). He further testified that 
no one eYer tried to stop him from using the road up to 
thr tilne the difficulty arose in this action (R. 131). 
Robert Burns Stonebraker first became acquainted 
with the 1\liddle Canvon R.oad about 50 Years before he 
~ . 
testified (R. 114:). (That "~ould be about 1906 and after 
the patent had is.sued to the {Tnion Pacific) He and others 
traveled the ~fiddle Canyon Road to go from Upton to 
dances in Grass Creek (R. 115). He ,,·as then 1± years 
of age (R. 115). He is now 62 years of age (R.114). (That 
would be about 1908) He stated that they would go over 
in w.agons and on horseback (R. 115). The last time he 
went over the road was about 5 years ago (R. 116). He 
worked in Grass Creek '"·hen he was homesteading in 
Section 28 in Middle Canyon (R. 116). Section 28 is the 
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property now O"\vned by the appellant (Exhibit 3, R. 
182). The road from his homestead to Grass Creek was 
miserable in a c.ar. They used a hayrack to travel it (R. 
116) but he drove his car from Section 28 to the main 
road to Upton and Coalville and never had any trQuble 
(R. 117) (This was the Niiddle Canyon Road from Appel-
lant's property to the main highway over the property 
of the respondent). Mrs. Stonebraker drove the road 
over respondent's property sometimes two times a week 
in 1925 (R. 117). People used to come up to their home-
ste.ad and several used the road to travel back and forth 
from Upton to Grass Creek, usually on horses (R. 117). 
Nephi Bailey and his wife used the road (R. 117). No 
one ever tried to stop Mr. Stonebraker from using the 
road (R. 117). Mr. Robinson, Charles _Bailey and the 
K eff.s traveled it in wagons from the year 1919 (R. 118). 
He saw other people travel it prior to 1925 (R. 118) . 
. L\.fter the years 1926 and 1927 he ceased to travel it 
''very much" (R. 118). lie went from Upton to Grass 
CrePk through 1fiddle Canyon on horseback for a dancl~ 
in 1932 (R. 119). Nephi Bailey had men working at G-rass 
Creek (R. 120 & 121). lie lived at Grass Creek and n1ade 
trips quite frequently to Upton (R. 121). They alway8 
usPd this road "It was so far around t.o go down Clark's 
Can~yon, they always traveled Middle Canyon Road" (R. 
121). 
f)avid E. Moore lived at Upton about 40 or 50 years 
(R. l2J ). He moved there in 1909 (R. 122). lle drove 
sheep, cows and horses through Middle Canyon when 
he lived there until seven or eight years ago. (R. 122). 
He saw men go up from the ranches to the mines ( R. 123). 
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These men would use the Chalk Creek and Middle Canyon 
road.s. (R. 123). In 1910 and 1911 Ivan Fewkes and Mr. 
Clark used the road to go to the mines (R. 123 & 124). 
Mr. Moore was never stopped from using the road (R. 
124). He has seen Joseph Boyer and the Neffs drive 
sheep up the Middle Canyon Road (R. 124). "In 1910 or 
1911 I drove cattle down Middle Canyon" (R. 126). He 
stated, "I used the Middle Canyon road at the time the 
cattle would be straying and I would bring them back, 
fetch them into my field." (R.126). Mr. Moore is 74 years 
of age {R. 127). 
Sam Smith, the man who sold the property to the 
respondent in 1944, (Exhibit 5, R. 184) stated that he 
gave the appellant pos.session about thirty days before 
the deed was delivered (R. 90). Mr. Smith lived on the 
property now owned by respondent twenty years and 
never refused anyone access to that road (R. 91). Leo 
Newton, Mr. Erconbrack and anyone who wanted to use 
the road used it (R. 91). Diston traveled over it to Grass 
Creek on horseback (R. 92). Sheep men used their ve-
hicles (R. 92), sheep camp.s and automobiles part way (R. 
92). Deer hunters used the road to the center of Section 
28 (R. 92). Stockmen used the road (R. 92). The high-
way above ~Ir. Smith was used as well as on his property 
(R. 93). He .and the Erconbracks used the road for twenty 
years and no one tried to stop them (R. 93). He bought 
the land in 1924 (R. 95). On cross examination, although 
he could not remen1ber the name of a certain man, he 
said, "but he had used the road, as f.ar as I 'Yas concerned 
it was never stopped to usage" (R. 95). 
The appellant, Vern Boyer, testified that he re-
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membered the road since he 'vaH a boy 9 or 10 years of 
age (R. 24). l-Ie is now 47 years of age (R. 24). Ile 
traveled the road to Grass Creek (R. 24). He worked 
for the Government in 1938 and 1939 and during the war 
\Vas .a range supervisor of Summit County for P.M.A. 
During that time he traveled most of the roads frequently. 
He traveled the road in question and observed others 
traveling it (R. 25). He observed live.stock being driven 
and vehicles going over the road (R. 26). The Middle 
Canyon road, the Coalville to Grass Creek road, has 
remained substantially in the same position during the 
time he reme1nbers (R. 27). He further testified that he 
has no other way of getting into his p·roperty, (R. 31 
& 32) except via Grass Creek and over the top five or 
six miles,. (R. 31 & 32) a.s compared with a one-half mile, 
plus 750 feet up the Middle Canyon road (R. 32). No 
one, except the respondent, ever tried. to stop him from 
using the road. On c~oss examination, Mr. Boyer testified 
that Lester· Osw.ald used the road (R. 39) with a sheep 
truck (R. 40). Appellant's father used the road to drive 
sheep (R. 40). Rube Davis trailed sheep in 1935, 1936 
and 193·7 (R. 41) for three years (R. 41). He had horses 
(R. 41). A Clark boy used the road to drive sheep (R. 
41). William Diston used the road. He had horses up 
there (R. 42"). William Diston rode hack and forth during 
the period the mine was working in Grass Creek (R. 42). 
lie saw Rube Davis take a wagon over the hill a time or 
two when he was homesteading in 1933, 1934 and 1935 
(R. 43). He saw besides the Boyer family and the Clark 
family, Mr. Davis and Mr. Carl B. Horton take wagons 
over the road (R. 44). Mr. Boyer stated he could get 
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to one end of his p~roperty up Clark's Canyon but it 
was impossible to drive lambs over the hill (R. 45). He 
further stated that his vehicles, wagons and trucks must 
come up the Middle Canyon road (R. 46). When asked 
whether he purch,ased a right of way from Blonquists, 
west of Mr. Clark's home, he replied, "No sir, I did not." 
(R. 46). He further testified, "The main road of the 
Blonquist's side goes up the ridge and a little trail 
eomes down to the bottom and crosses up the other side. 
You cannot go up with a truck or anything heavy, but 
it could be opened up with a tractor. You can go any 
}Jlace mostly with a tr,actor" (R. 72). He stated he had 
driven sheep up the Middle Canyon road (R. 47 & 48) 
for 8 or 10 years. Deer hunters have used the road (R. 
49). The soil conservation man used the road (R. 49). 
The use by the deer hunters was to get to the hunting 
ground (R. 64 & 65). 
J. Emerson Staples, County Clerk of Summit County, 
was called on behalf of respondent. He te.s~ified that 
Exhibit "B" is a map from his office (R. 137). It ~-as 
not offered to show all of the roads in Summit County 
(R. 137). He stated that 'vhere the roads are marked 
in blue they are County roads maintained.by the County. 
Mr. Staples searched the ordinance book. and found n~th­
ing in it concerning Middle Canyon. He n1ade a partial 
search of minutes and found nothing in the Clerk's office 
to show that Middle Canyon Road had been quoted as a 
County highway (R. 139). 
The remaining 'vitne.sses of the respondent; Clifford 
B. Clark, his wife, ~Irs. Clifford Clark and Dean Clark 
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did not testify concerning anything prior to the time they 
moved to Co.alville in 1944 (R. 140-170 inc.). Since it is 
the contention of appellant that the public road had been 
established long prior thereto and that since that time 
abandonment must be made by the exclusive methods 
provided by the Utah Statutes as amended in 1911, the 
testimony of these witnesses ha.s no important bearing 
upon the questions to be raised in this brief. Therefore, 
the summary of their testimony is omitted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The point upon which appellant intends to rely fo~ 
a reversal of the judgment below is as follows: 
I. The Court erred in hol9ing that no public high-
way or other public ea.sement exists over the property 
of respondent. 
To assist in the presentation of the argun1ent th~~ 
di~cussion will be divided into the following pro pJsitions: 
a. It was established by the uncontr.ad;_cted evi-
dence that the road and trail up Middle Canyon had 
been abandoned to the public and continuously used 
as a public thoroughfare for a period long in excess 
of ten years prior to the ye.ar 1911. 
b. It was established by the preponderance of the 
evidence that the road and trail up Middle Canyon 
had been abandoned to the public and continuously 
used as a public thoroughfare for a p·eriod in excess 
of ten years after the ye.a.r 1911. 
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c. Respondent did not attempt to establish that 
Middle Canyon road and trail had not been used 
or worked for a period of five years prior to 1911 
when the Compiled Laws of Utah, Section 1116, was 
amended to provide the two exclusive methods of 
abandonment of ,a public road. 
d. No evidence was produced to establish that the 
road and trail in question had been abandoned in the 
exclusive manner provided by statute since the year 
1911. 
ARGU~fENT 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 27-1-1 defines public 
high,vays as follows: 
"Public highways defined. - In all counties 
all roads, streets, alleys, lanes, courts, places, 
trails and bridges laid out or erected as such by 
the public, or dedicated or abandoned to the public, 
or made such in actions for the partition of real 
prop·erty, are public highways." 
It is contended by appellant that the road and trail 
in question was dedicated and abandoned to the public. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 27-1-2 defines the elements 
of dedication .and abandon1nent to a public use as follows: 
"Public use constituting dedication.-A high-
way shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period of ten years." 
a. USE BY PUBLIC PRIOR TO 1911 
Appellant's testimony on the use of the Middle Can-
10 
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yon Road co1nmences about 1880 (R. 100). Since Section 
34 in Middle Canyon w.as public domain until the issu-
ance of a patent by the United States Government to 
the Union Pacific Railroad on January 7, 1902, (R. 68) 
we must first determine whether, under the state of the 
law at that time, a public road could be acquired under 
the statutes of Utah over public lands belonging to the 
Federal Government. United States Code Annotated, 
Title 43, Public Lands, provides as follows.: 
"Section 932. Right of Way for Highways. 
The right of way for the construction of highways 
over public lands, not reserved for public uses, i;::; 
hereby granted. (R.S. Sec. 2477.)" Act of July 26, 
1866, c. 262, Section 8, 14 Stat. 253. 
Lindsey Land and Livestock Company v. Chu.rnos, 
et al, (Utah) 285 P. 646 made reference to this statute, 
and at page 648 analyzed the numerous holdings of vari-
ous courts as to what constituted an acceptance by the 
public of a right of way allowed by the above. quoted 
Federal statute and then held: 
"In the territory of Utah, the statutes in 
force during the times in question were as follows: 
Chapter 29, Laws of Utah 1880, provided: 
" 'Sec. 2. Highways are roads, streets or 
alleys and bridges laid out or erected by the pub-
lic, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated 
or abandoned to the use of the public. 
" 'Sec. 3. Roads laid out .and recorded as 
highways by the County Court, and all roads used 
11 
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as such for a period 'of five years, are high-
ways. ***" 
"By chapter 12, Laws of Utah 1886, Section 2, 
it was enacted: 
"All roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid 
out or erected by others than the Public and dedi-
cated or abandoned to the use of the public are 
highways. A highway shall be deemed and taken 
as dedicated and .abandoned to the use of the Puu-
lic when it has been continuously and uninter-
ruptedly u_sed as a Public thoroughfare for a 
period of ten years." 
". ( 2) In this case the court found as a fact 
that, while the lands traversed by the road were 
public lands of the United States the road wa~ 
used as a public thoroughfare for the period fron1 
1876 to 1894, a time in excess of that required by 
the territorial statutes in force for creating a 
public highway by use. That finding, if supported 
in fact, is sufficient in law to amount to an accep-
tance of the congressional gr.ant of the right of 
way over the public lands, and thus would consti-
tute and create the road in question a public high-
way by dedication." 
It is, therefore, established by our Supreme Court 
that a road may be abandoned and dedicated to the public 
use on public domain. In Lindsey Land and LiL~estock 
Company v. Ohurnos, et al., supra, a test is laid down 
which is of great assistance in this case .as follows: 
"While it is difficult to fix a standard by 
which to measure what is a public use or a public 
thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road 
was used by many and different persons for a 
variety of purposes; that it was open to all who 
12 
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desired to use it; that the use made of .it "\VH s 
as general and extensive as the situation and sur-
roundings would permit, had the road been forrn-
ally laid out as a public highway by public author-
ity. We therefore conclude that the court waH 
justified in finding that the ro.ad had been con-
tinuously and. uninterruptedly used as a pubJic 
thoroughfare for more than ten years." 
Applying this test to the case at bar, we observe 
that "rnany a11d different persons" used the l\Ilddle Can-
yon Ito ad jor ''a variety of purposes." J.a1ne~ JI. Judd 
drove eattle, shPep and a \\ragon over it (R. lOU). ~Ir. 
Judd -~.esti±ied in respon.se to the question, "Wbat others 
used it .be~i~es yourself~" "Well, anybody was traveling 
it that "\Van ted to" (R. 100). He further stated ~;nat others 
traveled it on horses and in wagons at the time the Grass 
Creek Mines were in operation (R. 100). Mr. Judd hauled 
coal across the property now owned by the re.spondent 
for fifty years (R. 101). Others were using it for the 
same purpose (R. 101). After Mr. Judd's marriage he 
and his wife used the road to visit his wife's parents 
in Grass Creek, traveling in a white top rig or a cart (R. 
102). 
James H. Wilde, a man 76 years of age, testified that 
the Middle Canyon Road from the Upton-Coalville road 
had remained the same as long as he could remember 
(R. 108). He traveled the road on foot and on horseback 
(R. 109). He .saw Will Robinson haul coal out of there 
and he stated, "When people wanted to go up there, they 
went up there" (R.109). 
Joseph H. Boyer knew the Middle Canyon Road 
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from about 1896 (R. 127). He used the Middle Canyon 
road to get wood ( R. 128). He also testified of people 
going to the Grass Creek Mines at that time (R. 128). 
He stated other people used the road to haul coal from 
the Clark Mines in Section 28 (R. 128 & 129). William 
Diston traveled the road to work at the mines (R. 129). 
Mr. Boyer further testified, in 1900 people used to go 
up in there with livestock, back and forth. His words 
were, "That was quite a traveled road up in there with 
livestock" (R. 130). 
This variety of uses took place before 1902 when 
the patent was granted the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany- (R. 68). "That it was open to all who desired to 
use it" before and after 1902 was testified by Mr. Judd, 
(R. 101) Mr. Wilde (R. 109) and Mr. Bo_yer (R. 130 & 
131). 
"That the use made of it was as general and exten-
sive as the situation and surroundings would permit, had 
the road been formally laid out as a public highway by 
public authority" is also evident from the festimony above 
cited. Between 1902 and 1911 this extensive use con-
tinued. Mr. Judd knew the road and used it for fifty 
years or more (R. 100). Mr. Boyer knew the l\fiddle 
Canyon Road from about 1896 (R. 127) and in his testi-
mony covered a period from that time up to the present 
time ( R. 127 to 135). 
To summarize, the ro.ad was used from approxi-
mately 1880 to 1911 to drive livestock, including cattle 
and sheep, (R. 100 & 130) to haul coal, (R. 101, 128 & 
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129) to visit with relatives, (R. 102) to haul wood, (R. 
128) to travel from home to work at the Grass Creek 
~1ines, (R.129) and ju.st before 1911 to travel from Upton 
to Grass Creek to dances (R. 114, 115). It was traveled 
on foot and on horseback, (R. 109) in wagons, (R. 100) 
in "vhite top rigs and carts (R. 102). The period of time 
such use took place was much in excess of ten years. 
As above outlined in this Argument and in the State-
ment of Facts shown, appellant's witnesses used the 
road and .saw it used continuously from approximately 
1880 (R. 100) for a period long past 1911. All of this 
evidence was without contradiction. Respondent produced 
no witness with any acquaintance of the situation during 
this period of time. 
b. USE BY PUBLIC SUBSEQUENT TO 1911 
Again we call to the Court's attention the fact that 
the testimony of the respondent covered only the period 
after respondent moved to Coalville in 1944 (R. 184). 
Mr. Judd's testimony covered a period of fifty years, 
or approximately from 1880 to 1930 (R. 100). Joseph H. 
Boyer's testimony commenced about 1896 and covered 
up to the present time (R. 127). Robert Burns Stone-
braker's testimony commenced in about 1906 or 1908 
(R. 114) · and continued to about five years before he 
testified (R. 116). David Moore's testimony covered a 
period from 1909 (R. 122) up to seven or eight years 
ago (R. 122). Sam Smith, th-e owner of the property 
in question just prior to respondent, showed a clear 
intent to abandon the road to public use when he testi-
fied that for twenty years he never refused access to 
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that road (R. 91), that as far as he was concerned it 
was neve-r stop·ped to usage (R. 95), and he knew it was 
being used by anyone who wanted to use it to travel to 
work (R. 92), to transport vehicles necessary in the 
sheep business (R. 92), including sheep camps and auto-
mobiles part way and by deer hunters to get back into 
the deer country (R. 92). ~Ir. Smith used the s.ame road 
that ran through his place through Middle Canyon from 
Boyers and Erconbracks and no one tried to stop him 
during the twenty years he traveled it (R. 93). Although 
there are conflicts in the testimony given by Vern Boyer, 
the appellant, and that given by the respondent and his 
family, it is not neces.sary to rely upon that testimony 
to prove the continuous use of this road and trail up 
Middle Canyon for a period in excess of ten years after 
1911. 
In connection with the establishment of a road or 
trail under the statute by abandonment to the public, 
app·ellant .acknowledges that under the law of this state 
a dedication rests primarily in the intent of the owner. 
Morris v. Blunt (Utah) 161 P. 1127 at 1130: 
" ( 1) A dedication rests prin1arily in the in-
tent of the owner. There n1ust be a concession in-
tentionally made by him, \vhich 1nay be proved by 
declarations or by acts, or n1ay be inferred from 
circumstances. No form or ceremony is necess.ary. 
It must, however, appear that he kne\v of the use 
by the public, and intended to grant the right of 
way to the public. No for1nal acceptance by any 
public officer or agent is necessary, but there 
must be actual use by the public. City of Cincinnati 
v. White, 6 Pet. 440, 8 L. Ed. 452; ~forgan v. Rail-
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ro.ad Co., 96 U.S. 723, 24 L. Ed. 7 43; Harkness v. 
Woodmansee, 7 Utah, 227, 26 Pac. 291; Whittaker 
v. Ferguson, 16 Utah, 240, 51 Pac. 980; Schettler 
v. Lynch, 23 Utah, 305, 64 Pac. 955; Culmer v. 
Salt Lake City, 27 Utah, 252, 75 Pac. 620; Wilson 
v. Hull, 7 Utah, 90, 24 Pac. 799." 
The facts in the foregoing case are not analogous 
to the case at bar, for in that case the road had been 
plowed up as much as ten years before the commencement 
of the action. Nevertheless, the statement concerning in-
tention is helpful when applied in this case. From 1880, 
the e.arlie.st testimony offered in this case, to 1902 when 
the Government issued a patent covering the land in 
question to the Union Pacific Railroad, we have a spe-
cific intent on the part of the GoveTnment to allow public 
roads to be established by use upon the public domain 
( 43 USCA 932). The only question remaining was 
whether the public accepted such an offer so made undeT 
the statute hereinbefore quoted, 43 USCA 932. 
The Supreme Court of this State in the case of 
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116, P. 2d 420 at 422, after quoting 
Section 932 of the United States Code, supra, stated: 
" 'By this act' said the court in Streeter v. 
Stalnaker, 61 Neb. 205,85 N.W. 47, 48, 'the govern-
ment consented that any of its lands not reserved 
for the public purpose might be taken and used 
for public roads. The statute was a standing offer 
of a free right of way over the public domain, 
and as soon as it was accepted in an appropriate 
manner by the agents of the public, or the public 
itself, a highway was established.' 
" 'It has been held by numerous courts that 
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the grant may be accepted by public use without 
formal action by public authorities, and that con-
tinued use of the road by the public for such 
length of time and under such circumstance.s as 
to clearly indicate an intention on the part of 
the public to accept the grant is sufficient. Mont-
gomery v. Somers, 50 Or. 259, 90 P. 67 4; Murray 
v. City of Butte, 7 Mont. 61, 14 P. 656; Hatch 
Bros. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109, 165 P. 518; Sprague 
v. Stead, 56 Colo. 538, 139 P. 544. Other decisions 
are to the effect that an acceptance is shown by 
evidence of user for such a length of time and 
under such conditions as would establish a road 
by pre.scri ption, if the land over which it passed 
had been the subject of private ownership. Oka-
nogan County v. Cheetham, 37 Wash. 682, 80 P. 
262, 70 L.R.A. 1027; City of Butte v. ~fikosowitz, 
39 Mont. 350, 102 P. 593, or of public user for suc1:). 
time as is prescribed in state statutes upon which 
highways are deemed public highways. ~leRose v. 
Bottyer, 81 Cal. 122, 22 P. 393; Schwerdtle v. 
Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 41 P. 448; Walcott 
Tp. ·v. Skauge, 6 N.D. 382, 71 N.\V. 5-1-1; Great 
N.R. Co. v. Viborg, 17 S.D. 374, 97 N.\,T. 6. See, 
also, annotation on neces.sity and sufficiency of 
acceptance, L.R.A. 1917 A, 355." 
". . . . In this case the court found as a fact 
that, while the lands traversed by the road were 
public lands of the United States the road was 
used as a public thoroughfare for the period from 
1876 to 1894, a tilne in excess of that required by 
the territorial statutes in force for creating a 
public highway by use. That finding, if supported 
in fact, is sufficient in la\v to amount to an accept-
ance of the congressional grant of the right of way 
over the public lands, and thus would constitute 
a public highway by dedication.'' 
18 
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Without reiterating the facts which have been here-
tofore set out, we feel it is sufficient to say that while 
the land in question was a part of the public domain .it 
'V.as traversed and used as a public thoroughfare fron1 
1880 to 1902, a time in excess of that required by the 
statute for creating a public highway by use. 
Appellant is not restricted by the evidence to the 
period before 1902 in which to establish a right of way 
by public use under the laws of this State. That use con-
tinued after the land was in private ownership. We huve 
heretofore quoted several of the witnesses who have 
testified that their use of the road met with no inter-
ference from anyone. If we are to give any meaning to 
the statute at all, a use for fifty years without objection 
certainly indicates an intention upon the part of the 
owners to allow the use to which the prop·erty was being 
put, especially when the use was so general as established 
by the evidence in this case. We think that a fair reading 
of the cases indicates that in order to constitute acqui-
escence in a legal sense, the owner must know the public 
is using his land as a road. There must be an act of the 
mind, a knowledge that the public is using the land as 
a highway, and a purpose on the part of the owner not 
to object. A knowledge of the use for such a purpose 
without objection by word or act, may authorize the 
inference that the owne-r consents to the appropriation. 
In this case, after 1902 no evidence is given as to 
intention of previous owners to Sam Smith who testified 
for the appellant, although the witnesses did refer to 
the use of the road prior to that time without inter-
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ference from anyone. However, in the case of Sam Sn1ith 
who owned the land in excess of ten years, he gave the 
significant statement heretofore quoted but which de-
serves requoting in light of the discussion. "But he had 
used the road, as far a.s I was concerned it w.as never 
stopped to usage" (R. 95). What clearer statement could 
be made as to intention of this owner~ Under these 
circumstances, the statutory period for creation of the 
road has passed sever.al times. 
Although the attorney for respondent endeavored, 
during the course of the trial, to prove private use of the 
road and trail, he was unsuccessful because many of the 
uses shown herein 'vere not in connection with the use 
of the land in the canyon and none of the uses was under 
claim of a private right of way. 
Respondent also attempts to minimize the claim of 
appellant on the ground that the road above appellant's 
property over the hill to Grass Creek was not t~~: type 
of a road that could be used by an automobile. How-
ever, the words of the statute include even trails and in 
this case wagons, livestock, horses all traversed the high-
way clear from the Coalville-Upton road to the Grass 
Creek road. 
The question of accessibility of the property of the 
appellant through other means of entrance simply goes 
to the urgency of the appellant's claim rather than to 
the merits of the controversy. Appellant testified that 
the Clark Canyon road went onto one end of his prop-
erty but that he could not drive the lambs over the hill 
to the property in ~fiddle Canyon (R. 45). The Blonquist 
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route does not belong to the appellant although it was 
purchased by his father .and it is not suitable for vehic-
ular traffic (R. 46 & 72). Appellant has learned "the 
hard way" since the enforcement of this decree that his 
property in Middle Canyon is greatly restricted without 
the use of the Middle Canyon Road. 
c. NO ABANDONMENT PRIOR TO 1911 
In Dahl v. Roach, (Utah) 287 P. 622, at 623, our 
Supreme Court g.ave a pertinent history of the statutes 
involved in this situation as follows: 
"Prior to 1911 we had a statute ( Comp. Laws 
Utah 1907, Sec. 1116) which provided: 'All high-
ways once established must continue to be high-
ways until abandoned by order of the board of 
county commissioners of the county in which they 
are situated, by operation of law; or by judgment 
of a court of competent jurisdiction; provideu, 
th.at a road not used or worked for a period of five 
years ceases to be a highway.' 
"In 1911 that section of our statutes was 
amended (Laws 1911, c. 142). It is now section 
2802, of the Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, and reads: 
'All highways once established must continue to 
be highways until abandoned by order of the~ 
board of county commissioners of the county in 
which they are situated, or by judgment of a court 
of competent jurisdiction.' " 
Although appellant established by clear and con-
vincing proof the continued use of Middle Canyon Road 
by the public for a variety of purposes under a per-
missive Federal statute and later with the knowledge 
and consent of the owners, respondent made no attempt 
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to show that this road and trail had not been used or 
worked for a period of five years prior to 1911. With-
out such proof, there were no facts upon which the Court 
could find an abandonment. 
--d. NO ABANDONMENT SUBSEQUENT TO 1911 
As indicated in Dahl v. Roach, supra, any abandon-
ment after 1911 must be by the exclusive methods pro-
vided by s1tatute which are by order of the Board of 
County Commis_sioners or by judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction. The only evidence produced by 
respondent in this regard was helpful to appellant, for 
the County Clerk of Summit County testified that he 
had searched the ordinance book and found nothing in 
it concerning Middle Canyon (R. 139). It was nowhere 
contended that any decree of the Court had previously 
been had abandoning this road. Rather, it has been the 
position of respondent that no road was ever established. 
This perhaps is his strongest position ''~th reference to 
abandonment, but it le.aves much to be desired in answer-
ing the uncontradicted evidence of the appellant con-
eerning the use of. the road and trail for the convenience 
of all who cared to use it for well over 50 years. 
CONCLUSION 
We, therefore, conclude that the finding No. 7 of the 
Conrt (R. 13) "That plaintiff has failed to produce 
sufficient evidence to establish .a public highway or 
easement over the p,roperty of the defendant in l\Iiddle 
Canyon in said Section 33 as alleged in plaintiff's com-
plaint" is contrary to the evidence and ignores the well-
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established principles of law as laid down by the Supren1e 
Court of this State. The judgment of the Court declaring 
that no public highway or other public easement exists 
up Middle Canyon is not supported by, and is contrary 
to, the evidence in the case. The Judgment should be 
reversed. 
ReBpectfully submitted, 
JOHN S. BOYDEN 
BOYDEN, TIBBALS, 
STATEN & CROFT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
351 South State, Suite No. 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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